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In this  paper,  we  present  an  analysis  of the  change  in  household  land  use  following  a conservation-driven
process  of  indigenous  land  titling  reform  in a  Cambodian  protected  area.  In each  of the  two  study  villages,
we  investigated  how  household  land  use  had  changed  and  the  extent  of  compliance  with  both  legal
boundaries  of  titled  areas  and  community  regulations  created  to govern  land  use  within  these  areas.
A  comparison  of  current  household  land  holdings  in  each  village  with  those  at  the  start  of the  tenure
reform  process  indicated  a signiﬁcant  increase  in  household  land  holdings.  Changing  land  use  practices
were  also  revealed,  as  households  shift  away  from  traditional  subsistence  based  land  use  towards  more
commercialised  agriculture.  Household  compliance  was  observed  to  be  strongly  correlated  with  total
land holdings  and participation  in  the  tenure  reform  process,  with  compliance  levels  signiﬁcantly  higher
in the  village  that had  experienced  lower  levels  of external  land  grabbing  and  immigration.  Similarly,ule compliance
understanding  and  perceptions  of  the tenure  reform  process  was  found  to differ  dramatically  between
the  two  study  villages.  The  importance  of supporting  local  resource  management  institutions  created
through  tenure  reform,  particularly  in  the  face  of strong  external  drivers  of change,  and of  engaging  with
immigrant  households  are  highlighted  as key  to  the  continuing  effectiveness  of  participatory  land  use
planning  approaches.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  licensentroduction
Sparsely populated, resource rich forest habitats have fre-
uently been subject to exclusionist policies by national govern-
ents, repeatedly failing to recognise the rights of the people living
nside such areas (Colchester, 2004). Biodiversity conservation has
 particularly chequered past in this regard, with the protection-
st ‘fences and ﬁnes’ approach dominating conservation practice
hroughout much of its history (Adams, 2004). Given the high bio-
iversity value of many forest habitats and often weak political
epresentation of forest peoples, it is no surprise that this approach
as brought conservation practitioners and forest inhabitants into
onﬂict (Brockington and Igoe, 2006). More recently, Government
fforts to meet commitments made under the Convention of Bio-
ogical Diversity (CBD) to set aside areas for the protection of
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London,
ilwood Park Campus, Buckhurst Road, Ascot SL5 7PY, UK. Tel.: +44 7813687159.
E-mail address: henry.travers@gmail.com (H. Travers).
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264-8377/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
biodiversity have brought further accusations of ‘green grabbing’
(Fairhead et al., 2012).
From the 1980s onwards, however, there has been increased
recognition of the customary rights of indigenous peoples, with
both international resolutions and national legislation slowly mov-
ing to reﬂect this. This has been reﬂected within conservation, with
article 8(j) of the CBD, decision 7.23 of the 2005 CBD Conference of
the Parties and the CBD’s 2010 Aichi target 18 all requiring signa-
tories to respect the rights and practices of indigenous and local
communities. Beyond international agreements, there has been
increasing acceptance within conservation organisations that the
rights of local communities must be considered, which has resulted
in a movement towards the principle of ‘doing no harm’ as a mini-
mum  requirement (Adams et al., 2004).
This change of approach is well reﬂected in the increasing trend
towards the adoption and recognition of various forms of indige-
nous or community conserved areas (ICCAs). As of 2008, it was
estimated that ICCAs encompassed over 400 million ha in 28 of
the world’s 30 most forested states, a signiﬁcant increase on simi-
lar calculations from 2002 (Sunderlin et al., 2008). This represents
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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 signiﬁcant step forward in the recognition of customary tenure
ights, although rights-related issues are often not the primary
mpetus behind the adoption of ICCAs (Berkes, 2009). One argu-
ent in support of ICCAs lies in their perceived effectiveness in
roviding greater protection beneﬁts in comparison with more
raditional forms of conservation management. Whilst there is
o guarantee that ICCAs result in positive biodiversity outcomes,
here is some evidence that points in this direction (for a review
ee Shahabuddin and Rao, 2010). Furthermore, as payments for
nvironmental services schemes become increasingly widespread,
lariﬁcation of disputed or informal tenure arrangements becomes
ver more necessary to ensure that payments are effective and cus-
omary rights holders do not lose out (Engel et al., 2008; Milne and
iesten, 2009; Larson, 2011).
In part, the success of rights-based approaches is dependent on
he manner in which they are implemented. The rise of ICCAs was
receded by greater interest in participatory approaches to conser-
ation (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Berkes, 2004) and in this regard
articipatory land use planning approaches have gained consider-
ble support. Such approaches are thought to be an improvement
n top-down land use planning methods, ensuring that the process
s more inclusive, makes greater use of local knowledge, reduces
he risk of future disputes and supports local level institutional
evelopment (McCall and Minang, 2005; Cronkleton et al., 2010).
oncerns have been raised, however, regarding the effect of partic-
patory land use planning approaches on local land use and the
egree to which land access ultimately reﬂects power arrange-
ents within a village. In an investigation of pilot participatory land
se planning projects in Laos, Lestrelin et al. (2011) found evidence
o suggest that, despite village participation, the process resulted
n maintenance of the status quo, with the extent of individual
ouseholds’ access to land dependent on their power to negotiate
ith village elites. It should, however, be noted that the participa-
ory planning process in upland Laos has been criticised for being a
ehicle for the imposition of land stabilisation policies, which casts
oubt on the ability of communities to have any meaningful input
egarding planning outcomes (Ducourtieux et al., 2005; Lestrelin,
010).
Despite participatory land use planning approaches being
idely applied in multiple contexts and for different purposes,
ublished case studies are rare and outcomes are often left uneval-
ated (Bourgoin, 2012). Where case studies have been published,
here is a distinct lack of analyses looking at how different groups
ithin villages have been affected by and comply with the insti-
utional changes brought about by participatory tenure reform
nstruments. In this study, we seek to redress this gap. We  eval-
ate the implementation of indigenous land titling, a product of
 participatory land use planning process, in two  villages in the
ambodian uplands, investigating at the household level how land
se has evolved following the initiation of this process. We  do this
n the context of a dynamic but varying socio-economic landscape
hat is driving signiﬁcant land use and demographic change. In this
ay, we are able to compare the performance of tenure reform in
wo villages that have been exposed to different levels of social and
conomic change.
We present an analysis of household land use change and com-
liance with both the legally binding zonation of community lands
nd community-agreed rules governing land use within commu-
ity zones. The land holdings of individual households had been
easured at the beginning of the process in each village. We re-
easured these holdings for a sample of households in each village
nd compared the size, location and use of the holdings to that
ecorded as part of the process. We  used these data to evaluate the
xtent to which the indigenous customary lands and the agreed
onservation areas of the two communities have been success-
ully protected from land conversion from forest to agriculture. Weicy 43 (2015) 186–196 187
analyse how individual household land use has changed since the
start of the land tenure reform process, in the context of rapidly
changing social and economic circumstances (in particular, immi-
gration of poor landless households). Within this analysis, we
investigate the effects of different socio-economic characteristics
thought to affect land use decision-making, including ethnicity,
available household labour, livelihood options, wealth and resi-
dency, on the behavioural response of households to land tenure
reform. We also examine understanding of the tenure reform pro-
cess and perception of tenure security in each of the study villages.
We believe that this provides a valuable case study from which
to draw lessons, not only for the implementation of land tenure
reform for Cambodia’s minority indigenous peoples, but for partic-
ipatory approaches to land use planning more widely.
Indigenous land tenure reform in Cambodia
Cambodia is home to several minority indigenous peoples
(believed to make up between 1% and 1.4% of Cambodia’s total pop-
ulation; National Institute of Statistics, 2008; Anderson, 2011), the
majority of whom live in remote forested upland areas, often in
and around gazetted protected areas (PAs). Although customs and
practices vary between groups, Cambodia’s minority indigenous
peoples have typically operated under a traditional system of col-
lective customary land tenure with a strong spiritual connection to
the surrounding landscape, particularly forests (ADB, 2002; Baird
and Dearden, 2003; Fox et al., 2008; Simbolon, 2009; Baird, 2013a).
Traditional livelihood systems relied heavily on small-scale swid-
den agriculture, in which only a modest proportion of communal
lands were cultivated at any one time. While swidden land use has
often been considered to have a negative impact on forest ecosys-
tems and subjected to efforts to ‘stabilise’ agricultural production
(e.g. Lao land reforms; Ducourtieux et al., 2005; Lestrelin, 2010),
there is evidence to suggest that such systems can be sustainable
(Fox et al., 2000). In recent years, however, there has been a shift
in many communities away from traditional agricultural practices,
with increasing reliance on the production of commercial and tree
crops (Fox et al., 2008).
Largely unaffected by the private property regime of French
colonial rule, Cambodia’s minority indigenous peoples came under
increasing pressure to integrate into Khmer society after indepen-
dence, culminating in forced integration and mass resettlements
during the Khmer Rouge period (1975–1979). Following Viet-
namese invasion in 1979, Cambodia’s minority indigenous peoples
were allowed to return to their ancestral lands (except in areas still
occupied by Khmer Rouge forces), although many did not return
until the 1990s. After the 1991 peace accord, a series of laws aimed
at reforming land ownership was  enacted, most notably the 2001
Land Law. From the perspective of indigenous communities, the
2001 Land law is particularly important, as it was the ﬁrst piece of
legislation to legally recognise the existence of Cambodia’s minor-
ity indigenous peoples (Baird, 2013b). It also provides the legal basis
to secure customary land rights and safeguards those rights until
such a time as legal title is granted. Once title is granted, these lands
are classiﬁed as state private lands, meaning that they remain the
property of the state but have no public interest (Oberndorf, 2005).
As such, communities do not hold the right to dispose of their land.
In order to apply for indigenous communal tenure (ICT), a com-
munity must ﬁrst register as an indigenous community (IC) and be
recognised as such by the Ministry of the Interior.
Whilst the 2001 Land Law provided the basis for ICT, there was
a long delay until the government passed the 2009 sub-decree on
the procedures for registration of the customary land of indigenous
communities. For much of this time, it was  unclear what legislation
would follow, though it was widely believed that the govern-
ment would support a participatory approach to land use planning.
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Table 1
Details of the participatory land use planning process in the two  study villages. Land
inside zones designated for agriculture is a mix  of cultivated land and forest that, as
yet, has not been cleared.
Andong Kraloeng O Rona
Zone areas
Residential/agriculture 1323 ha 1477 ha
NTFP forest 23,584 ha 2274 ha
Spirit forest 43 ha 44 ha
Burial forest 27 ha –
Total village area 25,003 ha 3795 ha
IC  formed/land mapped 2003 2005
ICT  application 2008 2009
ICT  zones redrawn 2010 Dec 2012
ICT  granted 2011 2013
Population (heads)
Start of PLUP process 390 (2004) 573 (2006)
June/July 2012 563 1041
Number of households88 H. Travers et al. / Land U
uch an approach had ﬁrst been applied in Cambodia in Ratanakiri
rovince in the 1990s and the government had subsequently shown
n interest in extending its use. In 2001, an implementation man-
al for government staff and development workers was  published
Rock, 2001). As such, it was felt by many that implementing par-
icipatory land use planning would be a ﬁrst step towards securing
and tenure for communities and for deﬁning the boundaries of cus-
omary use within protected areas. Eventually, it became clear that
his approach would not make its way into Cambodian legislation
nd, at that point, efforts switched mainly to working within the
CT framework. Partly as a consequence of this, progress towards
CT has been slow, with only seven villages having received title at
he time of writing (a further 160 are planned; Milne, 2013).
The stipulation under the 2001 Land Law to grant communal
and rights to Cambodia’s minority indigenous peoples was been
riticised for only granting such rights to a small minority of Cam-
odia’s population and for limiting those rights to agricultural land,
ather than extending them to forests (Baird, 2013b; Milne, 2013).
here is also some concern that, with respect to the recognition of
 community as ‘indigenous’, the law has adopted a static view of
hat it means to be indigenous by linking this to a community’s
dherence to traditional agricultural and cultural practices (Baird,
013b). This has added to issues regarding how individuals choose
o identify themselves and how they are identiﬁed by Cambodian
uthorities (Swift, 2013).
Despite legal reform recognising the rights of Cambodia’s
inority indigenous peoples and rural smallholder framers, land
isputes, alienation and large-scale land grabbing are frequent and
idespread. While large-scale land acquisitions are by no means
 recent phenomenon in Cambodia, the situation has been greatly
xacerbated in recent years. The human rights NGO ADHOC reports
hat 2,657,470 ha (approximately 17% of the total land area of the
ountry) had been granted as economic land concessions (ELCs;
reas of up to 10,000 ha granted to industrial companies for inten-
ive agriculture), as of December 2012 (ADHOC, 2013). Not only has
his had extreme implications for Cambodian smallholder farmers
ut also for conservation. In 2012 alone, ELCs covering 381,121 ha
ere granted, of which over 70% are within existing protected
reas. Given the high degree of overlap between Cambodia’s minor-
ty indigenous peoples and the country’s protected area network,
fforts to secure minority customary rights may  also serve as added
rotection from ELCs for protected areas.
and tenure reform in the two  study villages
The study was undertaken in two villages in Mondulkiri
rovince, northeastern Cambodia: Andong Kraloeng in O Reang
istrict and O Rona in Keo Seima District (Fig. 1). Both villages
re located within Seima Protection Forest (SPF), a former log-
ing concession that covers a total area of 2926 km2 and is now
anaged by the Forestry Administration (FA) with technical and
nancial support from the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS;
vans et al., 2012). The predominant minority indigenous group in
he area are the Bunong, who belong the Mon-Khmer language fam-
ly (Bourdier, 2009). During the Khmer Rouge period, the area was
lmost totally abandoned, as households living there were forcibly
esettled in the lowland north of Mondulkiri, with the majority
f families returning in the 1990s and early 2000s (Evans et al.,
012). This resulted in the partial loss of knowledge regarding the
oundaries of customary land (P. Phaktra, pers. comm.). In 2003,
A authorities took the strategic decision to initiate a programme
f participatory land use planning with local villages in order pro-
ect the customary rights of indigenous communities within the
A and to counter two of the main drivers of deforestation at that
ime (agricultural expansion by local villagers and forest clearingStart of PLUP process 93 (2004) 121 (2006)
June/July 2012 124 229
by migrant households; Evans et al., 2012). This programme, which
was initially piloted in Andong Kraloeng and later expanded to
include other villages (Evans et al., 2012), involved a series of con-
sultations with local communities, following procedures based on
the government’s manual for participatory land use planning.
Andong Kraloeng is a Bunong village, consisting of six smaller
sub-village settlements, located within the densely forested core
zone of SPF on the main road between Phnom Penh and the
provincial capital, Sen Monorom. Despite being situated along the
main road, it has been little affected by immigration from other
provinces. In 2011, a sub-decree was passed recognising the rights
of the Andong Kraloeng IC, making them the third IC nationally
to be granted rights over their customary land (UNOHCHR, 2011).
The second study village, O Rona, is located at the edge of SPF and
the adjacent Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary (SWS), managed by the Min-
istry of Environment (MoE), and consists of ﬁve smaller sub-village
settlements. Historically, the village was  an indigenous Bunong
community but in recent years it has been heavily affected by an
inﬂux of immigrant Khmer families seeking land. As the village is
situated close to both the district capital and the border with Viet-
nam, it is considerably more integrated into the market economy
than Andong Kraloeng. This has affected traditional livelihoods,
with a greater reliance on commercial agriculture readily appar-
ent amongst Bunong households. It also presents a greater threat
to community lands from speculators and immigrants; at the time
that the land tenure reform process was initiated in 2005, there
were 35 claims to land inside the traditional village boundary from
households living in other villages.
At the start of the ICT process in both villages, a provisional
Indigenous Community was set up. Under Cambodian law, formal
recognition by the Ministry of the Interior of a community’s status
as an indigenous community is a legal pre-requisite for applica-
tions for ICT. For each IC, PA authorities facilitated the local people
to select a committee, with committee members drawn mainly
from traditional village elders. Every indigenous household liv-
ing in the village at that time elected to join. Following this, the
former extent of customary use was investigated using a variety
of sources (including historical topographical maps, aerial surveys,
forest inventories and local knowledge) and all land holdings within
the provisional village area were mapped by PA authorities. On
completion, a series of zones was  created delineating areas of differ-
ent land use (Table 1). These included zones designated for current
and future agriculture, as well as community forest in which the
only form of resource use permitted is the collection of non-timber
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uFig. 1. Map  of Seima Protection Forest (2926 k
orest products (NTFPs). These zones are managed by the IC com-
ittee.
In addition to the creation of the different land use zones, the
CT process supported the agreement of a series of rules governing
ousehold land use, made enforceable by traditional village sanc-
ions, to assist in the management of village land. These regulations,
hich were largely drawn up from informal traditional practices,
ere designed to allow the IC to plan for future growth but also
o protect traditional livelihoods. As such, limits were put on the
rea of paddy land and tree crops allowed for each household. A
illage constitution, which details the formal composition of the
ommittee, the goals of the IC and criteria for IC membership, was
lso drawn up.
The main difference between the procedure followed in O Rona
nd that of Andong Kraloeng was the number of Khmer migrant
amilies living in the village at the time of the ICT process. Under the
001 Land Law, households are entitled to claim ownership of occu-
ied land provided their claim had been uncontested for at least
ve years prior to the promulgation of the law. Land claimed after
001 is not eligible for private ownership and under law remains
tate property. Although the ICT process in O Rona included every
ousehold living in the village, households belonging to the major-
ty Khmer ethnic group were only permitted to retain the land
hey already occupied as they are excluded from the communal
itle granted to the IC. Any expansion of their land within those
reas identiﬁed for future agricultural use would be illegal under
he 2001 Land Law. This created a two-tiered system within the vil-
age, with Khmer immigrant households granted fewer rights than
heir returnee Bunong neighbours. This was not an issue in Andong
raloeng as there were no Khmer households in the village at the
ime of the ICT process. In both villages, the rules governing land
se within the village area apply only to Bunong households and to
he Khmer households present during the ICT process, as recent set-
lers are not permitted to claim any land within community zones.
ewly formed households of married children of IC members auto-
atically become members of the IC, with the accompanying land
se rights and responsibility to abide by community rules.howing the location of the two study villages.
Methods
Fieldwork for the study was carried out in both villages between
May  and July 2012, and consisted of a series of focus group discuss-
ions, household structured interviews and land use mapping.
Focus group discussions
The aim of the focus group discussions was to gain a better
understanding of land use practices and to investigate local per-
ceptions regarding land issues. Each focus group consisted of 8–15
participants and lasted approximately two  hours. In each village,
one focus group was  held with members of the IC committee
responsible for the management of community zones. In O Rona,
three additional focus group discussions were held, which sepa-
rated participants who had been present at the time of the initial
planning exercise and those who  had not, as there is a strong dis-
tinction in rights between newly arrived and resident households.
In Andong Kraloeng, immigration rates are low and the population
relatively homogeneous, so this was not deemed necessary.
Household interviews and land use mapping
Structured household interviews and land use mapping were
conducted for 114 households, with 44 sampled in Andong Kralo-
eng and 70 in O Rona (approximately one third of the households
in each of the study villages), stratifying proportionally by sub-
village settlement and randomly sampling within each stratum.
No households living outside either of the villages were sampled.
This approach provided a cross-sectional sample and was  selected
to ensure that both newly arrived immigrants and newly formed
households (e.g. through marriage) were included in the study. As
the original land use mapping process included every plot of land
within each community zone, a cross-sectional survey design pro-
vided sufﬁcient matches between the two time periods to allow for
simple panel analyses.
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els was checked by comparing the sum of squared Pearson residuals
with the approximate residual degrees of freedom. No issues were
found in any checks.90 H. Travers et al. / Land U
The purpose of the structured interviews was to collect socio-
conomic and land use data for each household, as well as gathering
nformation on perceptions of land issues and knowledge of the
CT process (see Supplementary Materials for questionnaire used).
here possible, all interviews were conducted with the head of
ach household and lasted for approximately 45 min. Following
he completion of each interview, all land parcels held by the
espondent household were measured by walking the parcel edge
nd recording the path taken on GPS. Observations were made
egarding the crops grown, the likely age of those crops and adjoin-
ng land uses and owners to triangulate information given during
nterviews.
and use mapping check
A set of 100 random points was sampled across each village
rea, and the owner of the land at each point identiﬁed, in order to
heck whether information about sensitive plots was  being with-
eld during the interviews. Given that a signiﬁcant proportion of
ouseholds hold land illegally, it was considered likely that par-
icipants might opt to withhold sensitive plots. As sampling within
ach village was incomplete and did not cover land claimed by out-
ide interests, uncertainties existed regarding whether the team
ad been shown all plots used by the households sampled. Recent
and cover analysis (WCS, unpublished) and satellite imagery were
sed to identify areas under cultivation. Random points were gen-
rated within un-visited areas of cultivated land for each settlement
sing ArcMap version 10.0. Local guides or members of the vil-
age ICT committees assisted in identifying the landowner at each
oint. The names collated were then cross-checked against the
ist of households already interviewed to ascertain whether any
lots had been withheld. This provided a measure of the number of
ithheld plots for each village. In cases where plots had been with-
eld, the household head was re-interviewed and the plot mapped.
nterviewers were careful at this stage to stress that they were clar-
fying the details given during the original interview and to avoid
ny accusation that the respondent had deliberately misled the
esearch team.
patial compliance analysis
Land use compliance was measured against two sets of criteria:
ith the law and with IC regulations governing land use within
ommunity boundaries. Plots measured in 2012 as part of this study
ere compared with those of each household as measured during
he previous ICT process and with the various boundaries created
hrough the ICT process. In certain cases, records were incomplete,
hich had the effect of reducing the overall sample size for the
ompliance analyses to 105 households. These spatial comparisons
ere carried out using Quantum GIS version 1.8.0. A margin of error
f 0.05 ha or 5%, depending on which was greater, was  used to allow
or differences in digital and physical boundaries.
For Andong Kraloeng, these analyses were made more com-
licated as zone boundaries were changed in 2010. This created
 situation where plots that had previously been compliant were
ade non-compliant and vice versa. In the former case, plots were
onsidered to be compliant for the purposes of this analysis, despite
he boundary changes. In the latter case, plots were considered non-
ompliant if they were outside community agricultural zones when
nitially cleared, but compliant if they were within community agri-
ultural zones when cleared. For both cases, it was necessary to use
eported plot age, triangulated against observations made during
lot measurement, to check whether the plot had been cleared at
he time the boundaries were changed. For O Rona, the boundaries
ad not been changed at the time of the survey so this was not
n issue. In both villages, however, it was necessary to correct for
hether or not each household was a member of the IC. In Andonglicy 43 (2015) 186–196
Kraloeng, all non-members of the IC were excluded from holding
land within the community zone, but at the beginning of the ICT
process all households were members of the IC. In O Rona, non-IC
households that were present in the village at the beginning of the
ICT process were allowed to keep the land they owned at that time
but any further expansion was  prohibited, while households that
had moved to the village afterwards were excluded from claiming
land.
In addition to analysing land use compliance with the law,
we also checked for compliance with ﬁve regulations governing
land use within IC managed zones. These were regulations ban-
ning: (1) buying, selling or renting land, (2) clearance of spirit or
burial forest, (3) exceeding 2 ha of land for tree crops (such as
cashew or rubber) per household, (4) exceeding 1 ha of land for
cultivation of paddy rice per household and (5) exceeding 5 ha of
land under any form of cultivation per household. In each case, if
these regulations had been broken prior to the rules being drawn
up, then the household was  considered compliant provided that
there were no new infractions. For example, if a household cul-
tivated 7 ha of land prior to the start of the ICT process, they
were allowed to keep all 7 ha. If, however, they subsequently
cleared more land within the community zone, they were judged
to be non-compliant with the 5 ha area limit. For the purposes
of this analysis, only land within the community zones was  con-
sidered, as the IC regulations only govern land use within these
zones.
Statistical modelling
Linear and generalised linear mixed models (LMMs; GLMMs)
were selected using backwards step-wise selection methods based
on the small sample size corrected Akaike Information Criterion
(AICc; Akaike, 1974; Burnham and Anderson, 2002).1 Models with
the lowest AICc were selected except in cases where a more parsi-
monious model was  found with a AICc value of less than two. The
variable settlement, which referred to each sub-village settlement
surveyed, was  included as the only random effect in all models
(see Supplementary Materials for a list of the explanatory variables
considered for each model).
In order to model the area of household land claimed illegally,
we used a hurdle modelling approach to account for the high num-
ber of zero values (Mullahy, 1986). Compliance with the 2001 Land
Law was  modelled ﬁrst using a simple binary variable. Subsequent
modelling of correlates of illegal land area claimed was  carried out
only for those households with some illegal land. All area variables
were transformed using natural logarithms. In cases where area
variables contained zero values, a constant equal to half the lowest
non-zero value was  ﬁrst added to all data points. The exception to
this was  for the model of total area held per household. For this
model, three zero value data points were removed and the sensi-
tivity of the coefﬁcients tested. Removing these data points did not
have a signiﬁcant effect on the model estimates and greatly aided
interpretation of the results.
In each case, once the ﬁnal model had been selected, visual
validation was conducted to check for residual normality, het-
eroskedasticity and possible correlations between ﬁxed effects and
the residuals. Over-dispersion in binomial logistic regression mod-1 All statistical analysis was carried out using R version 2.15.1, on RStudio version
0.97.314. Within R, the lme4 package version 0.999375-36 was used to analyse all
models.
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Table  2
Mean area (ha) given to different land uses per household for the two villages at
the  time ﬁelds were mapped by PA authorities as part of the ICT process and in
2012. The percentage of average household area given to each land use is shown in
parentheses. As intercropping is common practice, percentages do not sum to 100.
Land use Andong Kraloeng O Rona
2004 2012 2006 2012
All cultivation 1.0 2.7 3.1 4.8
Cash crop (cassava, cashew and
rubber)
0.6 (62) 2.5 (93) 2.9 (94) 4.2 (88)
Tree crop 0.7 (68) 1.4 (50) 2.8 (90) 1.9 (40)
R
L
A
4
f
h
s
o
f
t
s
T
a
t
c
h
i
o
1
a
i
t
3
I
r
t
l
g
c
l
r
a
o
f
2
h
i
m
t
n
(
c
f
m
w
c
Table 3
Parameter estimates for the household land holdings LMM, with ln(area) as the
response variable. One random effect was included in the model: settlement (std.
dev.  = 0.191). The full list of variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given in
Supplementary Materials.
Variable Estimate SE t value
Intercept −2.565 0.503 −5.095
Age 0.015 0.006 2.526Rice 0.9 (85) 0.2 (7) 0.8 (26) 0.6 (13)
Cassava 0.0 (0) 1.8 (67) 0.1 (3) 3.0 (63)
esults
and use change in the two villages
ndong Kraloeng
In Andong Kraloeng, 44 households were interviewed, of which
3 currently hold land (see Fig. A.1 in Supplementary Materials
or plan of mapped ﬁelds). Overall, the area held by each house-
old increased signiﬁcantly between 2004 and 2012 (Table 2). A
hift away from traditional indigenous land use systems was  also
bserved. Such systems tend to be highly diverse, with many dif-
erent crops commonly grown in small amounts around the edge of
he same parcel of land (Baird and Dearden, 2003), so we limit our-
elves here to discussing changes to the dominant crop in each ﬁeld.
he most dramatic change observed is the transition to commercial
griculture and a simultaneous decrease in the area of rice cultiva-
ion. The increase in the total area on which cash crops (cashew,
assava and rubber) are grown was greater than the increase in land
eld per household (Table 2). There was also a signiﬁcant increase
n the area under tree crop cultivation, which points to an erosion
f traditional rotational farming practices.
The area held by sampled households totalled 133 ha, with
19 ha in cultivation. This represents a signiﬁcant expansion in the
verage area of land under cultivation per household, from 1.0 ha
n 2004 to 2.7 ha in 2012 (Table 2). Extrapolating this land use for
he entire village population gives a total area under cultivation of
34 ha, which remains a small fraction of the 1398 ha granted to the
C for agricultural and residential purposes, and shows that there
emains considerable scope for agricultural expansion.
In 2004, the average area under some form of cash crop cultiva-
ion (principally cashew) was 0.6 ha per household, or 62% of the
and under cultivation. Much of this land, however, was  also used to
row non-cash crop upland rice intercropped with the main cash
rop. For instance, 0.5 ha per household, equivalent to half of all
and use within the village, was used for cashew plantations with
ice grown underneath or between young trees. By 2012, the aver-
ge area of cash crops had risen to 2.5 ha per household, or 93%
f the area cultivated. The majority of this increase is accounted
or by the emergence of cassava, a crop that was  unrecorded in
004. In 2012, the average cultivated area of cassava was 1.8 ha per
ousehold (67% of the cultivated area), with 1.4 ha per household
ntercropped with cashew. In contrast, the importance of rice (the
ain subsistence crop grown) had dropped, with only 0.2 ha (7% of
he cultivated area) per household cultivated with rice as the domi-
ant or intercropped crop. Whereas, in 2004, 85% of cultivated land
0.9 ha) had rice as the dominant or intercropped crop.
Not only does this show an increasing reliance on producing
ash crops but it also shows a breakdown of traditional rotational
arming. As of 2012, cashew, a tree crop, was present in approxi-
ately 1.4 ha of land per household (up from 0.6 in 2004), much of
hich was formerly used for growing rice (Table 2). As cashew is
onsidered to have a 20 year productive life span, land that wouldPoverty score 0.338 0.049 6.828
Immigrant −0.622 0.199 −3.132
formerly be returned to fallow, and therefore collective owner-
ship, is now being retained as individually held land (albeit within
communal title) through the planting of cashew.
O Rona
In O Rona, the average land holdings per household were found
to be signiﬁcantly higher than for Andoung Kraloeng and also
demonstrated a rapid expansion in the land being cultivated since
the beginning of the ICT process (Table 2; see Fig. A.2 in Supple-
mentary Materials for plan of mapped ﬁelds). However, changes
in land use practices were not as striking as in Andoung Kralo-
eng. Here, commercial agriculture was  already widely practiced in
2006, and the proportion of household land holdings on which cas-
sava, cashew and rubber were grown was  essentially unchanged
between surveys, although the absolute area was much increased
(Table 2).
The main observed difference between the two time periods
was the change in intercropping practices between commercial and
subsistence crops. A signiﬁcant drop was observed in the area of
land on which rice, a subsistence crop, was intercropped with one
of the main cash crops. This was matched by an increase in the area
of land given solely to rice cultivation (largely through new areas
suitable for paddy farming being cleared), such that the total area
of land under rice cultivation did not change signiﬁcantly (Table 2).
This suggests an increasing delineation between areas assigned to
growing cash crops and to subsistence rice cultivation.
As with Andong Kraloeng, the most dramatic shift in O Rona
was the uptake of cassava, which was ﬁrst introduced in 2005.
Less than 0.1 ha per household was  being grown in 2006 but this
had increased to over 3 ha per household by 2012. This, in part,
is driving the changes observed in rice growing practices, as cas-
sava is often sold to traders by the ﬁeld. Households, often those
short of labour, agree a sale price set by the area of their ﬁeld and
quality of the cassava, as opposed to harvesting and processing the
cassava themselves. Consequently, it makes sense for households
to have separate plots for different crops, even within the same
ﬁeld.
The emergence of cassava has also changed the area given to
tree crops. In 2006, the average household had 2.8 ha of tree crops,
largely intercropped with rice, but by 2012 this had dropped to
1.9 ha and was intercropped with cassava instead. This demon-
strates a trend reported during household interviews that some
farmers have chosen to replace areas previously planted with tree
crops with cassava. Overall, however, the reduction in area planted
with tree crops does not indicate a return to traditional rotational
cultivation as cassava is being grown year after year, despite fears
of declining yields.
Household land holdings
The selected model for the total log transformed area of land
held by each household in 2012 included three signiﬁcant explana-
tory variables (Table 3): the age of the head of the household,
whether or not they had arrived after the ICT process was initiated
and an adjusted poverty score based on the basic necessity survey
methodology (Davies, 1997; see Supplementary Materials for an
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Table 4
Parameter estimates for the illegal household land holdings model, with ln(illegal
area) as the response variable. P values signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level are
shown in bold. The full list of variables modelled, plus their explanations, are given
in Supplementary Materials.
Variable Estimate SE P value
Intercept −0.359 0.156 0.025
ln(area) 1.084 0.107 0.000
Rona, only the ban on clearance of burial or spirit forest was  com-
pletely observed (Table 5). In contrast to Andong Kraloeng, nearly
50% of households were found to be breaking total area restric-
tions within the community zones. In part, this was due to non-IC
Table 5
Percentage of respondent households that were found to have complied with the
ﬁve  community land use regulations. Only land inside the community agricultural
zones was considered.
Regulation Andong Kraloeng O Rona
Max  5 ha total area 92 56
Max  1 ha paddy land 100 9492 H. Travers et al. / Land U
xplanation of how this score was calculated). This meant that nei-
her the household’s livelihood options nor available labour had a
igniﬁcant effect on land holdings.
There was a positive effect of age on household land hold-
ngs, predicting an increase of 1.5% in the area held for every year
ncrease in the age of the household head. A much stronger cor-
elation was found for the adjusted poverty score. In this case, a
nit increase in adjusted poverty score (indicating that a house-
old is becoming better off) was found to be associated with an
ncrease of 34% in the total area held. This results in a predicted
32% difference in the total area of land held between the best off
nd poorest families. Immigrant households, however, were found
o have smaller land holdings, with the model estimates predicting
hat households that arrived after the ICT process had started had
2% less land on average.
ousehold compliance
ompliance with the 2001 Land Law
Overall, there were high levels of non-compliance in both study
illages, although distinct differences in behaviour between the
wo were observed. In Andong Kraloeng, 26% of cultivated land
ad been cleared outside agreed boundaries, whereas the ﬁgure
or O Rona was 47%. Similarly, while 52% of sampled households
n Andong Kraloeng were found to have some illegal land, this
gure was 79% in O Rona. Comparing the performance of the
ndigenous communities within each village reduces this differ-
nce slightly, with 49% of IC member households non-compliant in
ndong Kraloeng and 67% in O Rona.
In order to investigate compliance, we ﬁrst looked at whether
r not a household held any illegal land, constructing a GLMM
ith a binary household compliance variable as the response (see
upplementary Materials for model summary table). Only two
xplanatory variables considered for selection were included in the
nal model; whether the household was part of the village IC and
he natural log transformed area held by each household. The dif-
erence in compliance between the two villages was  accounted for
y the inclusion of the settlement lived in by each household as a
andom effect in this model.
As the interpretation of logistic regression coefﬁcients is not
ntuitive for log transformed variables with constants added to
ccount for zero values, we plot the effect of the area held by each
ousehold on the probability of compliance with the 2001 Land Law
or both IC and non-IC member households (Fig. 2). Among non-IC
ember households, only those with very little land are likely to
omply with the law. This result is, perhaps, unsurprising, as non-IC
embers have little right to land within either village. As the major-
ty of sampled non-IC member households live in O Rona, this result
trongly reﬂects the two-tiered system that was created there. In
act, the three non-member households that have not claimed land
llegally hold no land at all and provide labour for other house-
olds. None of the 20 sampled non-IC member households that
ere present in the village in 2006 was found to be compliant with
he law in 2012.
Comparing the curves for IC and non-IC households reveals a
trong positive effect of being an IC member on compliance. This
ffect diminishes rapidly, however, as the area of household land
oldings increases. The predicted probability of being compliant
ith the law for an IC member holding the average area of land
s just over 0.2, illustrating the very low levels of compliance for
amilies with average or greater land holdings (Fig. 2).
The second part of the compliance hurdle analysis comprised
 linear model with the log-transformed area of illegal land held
y non-compliant households as the response. Three ﬁxed effects
ere included in the ﬁnal model (Table 4): the total land holdings of
ach household, whether households were members of the IC andIC  member −0.500 0.246 0.046
Indigenous −0.521 0.245 0.037
whether the household head was  Bunong. This ﬁnal variable was
possible because several Khmer men  had married Bunong women
and moved into their wives’ home villages. Under the rules drawn
up by each IC, these households automatically became IC members
even though the head of the household was Khmer. The results of
this model again show a strong correlation between compliance
and the total area of land held by each household. In this case, an
increase in the total area of 1% resulted in a 1.1% increase in the
area of illegal land held per household, suggesting that households
hold legal and illegal land in roughly equal proportions.
More informative, from the perspective of evaluating the out-
comes of the ICT process, are the effect estimates for being an IC
member at the time the ICT process was initiated and for the house-
hold head identifying themselves as indigenous. The effects of these
two variables are comparable, with an approximate 50% reduction
in the predicted area of illegal land held in both cases. This suggests
that, even among those households that had held land illegally,
there is a positive effect on compliance from being a member of an
IC. The second of these two  results suggests that, holding the effect
of being an IC member constant, households with indigenous heads
hold less illegal land than those with heads from non-indigenous
backgrounds.
Compliance with community regulations
The second aspect of household compliance considered was
whether households complied with the set of ﬁve regulations that
were drawn up as part of the original agreements in each village
and which govern land use within community zones. Overall, IC
regulations experienced a higher rate of compliance than observed
for the 2001 Land Law. In Andong Kraloeng, 77% of households were
found to be compliant with all ﬁve IC regulations considered. In O
Rona, the ﬁgure was  lower, with 52% of households compliant.
In Andong Kraloeng, three of the rules were obeyed by every
household sampled: those prohibiting the buying and selling of
land, clearing land in spirit and burial forest and exceeding 1 ha of
paddy land (Table 5). The regulation with the lowest level of compli-
ance was  the limit on tree crop area, with all households who  were
not totally compliant breaking this rule. This reﬂects the changes in
the traditional rotational cultivation system observed earlier. In OMax  2 ha tree crop cultivation 77 81
Spirit/burial forest 100 100
No  buying/selling land 100 92
All  regulations 77 52
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wig. 2. Predicted probabilities of compliance with the 2001 Land Law for non-IC an
or  the whole sample.
ember households claiming land that they had not possessed in
006. At 68%, the compliance rate for IC members was  still lower
han in Andong Kraloeng, but higher than for the village overall.
A mixed model approach to analysing IC regulation compliance
as deemed unnecessary in this case, as no difference in compli-
nce was attributed to different settlements. Instead, a generalised
inear model (GLM) was produced, with three explanatory vari-
bles included in the ﬁnal selected model: the log-transformed total
ousehold land holdings, whether the household was an IC member
nd whether the household held some illegal land. The effect of the
rea held by each household on the probability of compliance with
C regulations is plotted for both IC and non-IC member households
Fig. 3; see Supplementary Materials for coefﬁcient estimates).
Increased household land holdings are associated with a sig-
iﬁcant reduction in the probability of compliance with the set of
ve IC regulations. This effect is most striking for non-IC members
Fig. 3). It is also clear from comparing the curves for non-IC and
C member households that once again there is a strong positive
ffect on compliance associated with a household belonging to the
illage IC. Again, this is expected given the two-tier system in place
n O Rona, in which non-IC members were afforded little right to
and. Crucially, non-member households are not represented on the
ommittee that manages community land. It is unsurprising, there-
ore, that households do not comply with regulations on which
hey have no say. Interestingly, the correlation between compli-
nce with IC rules and compliance with the 2001 Land Law was
egative. Comparing the curves in Fig. 3 for households with and
ithout illegal land for both IC members and non-IC members sep-
rately, it is evident that households with illegal land have a greater
robability of being compliant with the regulations governing land
se in community zones over the full range of total land holdings.
his implies that households may  seek to circumvent IC regulations
y clearing land outside of community zones, rather than breaking
he regulations within the zones.
erceptions of ICT
In addition to differences in land use, understanding and per-
eptions of the ICT process differed signiﬁcantly between the two
illages. In Andong Kraloeng, 90% of IC respondents displayed some
nderstanding of the land use plan (this ﬁgure was only 46% of
C respondents in O Rona). There was also a much greater level
f understanding in Andong Kraloeng that the responsibility for
onitoring and sanctioning households who were non-compliant
ith the land use plans was split between the committee and theouseholds. The vertical dashed line shows the average area claimed per household
protected area authorities. Whilst 44% of IC respondents in Andong
Kraloeng mentioned the committee when asked who enforced the
land use plans, the ﬁgure in O Rona was only 17%.
With respect to how the land use plans were perceived, commu-
nity members in Andong Kraloeng were more likely to view the land
use plans positively and to feel secure about their land tenure. In O
Rona, IC members frequently queried the validity of IC regulations
and restrictions on area, citing the failure of committee members
(i.e. those charged with managing community resources) and other
community leaders to observe them. The average land holdings for
such leaders in O Rona were 8.6 ha, well above the limit of 5 ha
set down in IC rules. Conversely, community leaders in Andong
Kraloeng held an average of just 2.9 ha, which is below the village
average. IC members in O Rona also felt less secure regarding their
land tenure. Only 6% of respondent reported that they felt secure in
their tenure, with most respondents worried about economic land
concessions or powerful immigrants taking their land (in compar-
ison 72% of IC respondents in Andong Kraloeng felt secure).
Discussion
This study reveals households in two villages responding to land
tenure reform and drivers of land use change in different ways. In
Andong Kraloeng, compliance with both the legal land use plans
that were created as part of the tenure reform process and the com-
munity regulations that govern land use in community zones was
relatively high. In O Rona, a village that has been strongly exposed
to market forces and immigration, compliance rates were much
lower, with extensive illegal land clearance within conservation
areas and illegal settlement of Khmer migrants observed. The rea-
sons behind these differences are complex and multi-faceted, yet
they provide valuable lessons for further implementation of ICT in
Cambodia, and participatory land use planning approaches more
widely.
The most signiﬁcant difference between the two villages is the
degree to which they have been exposed to outside interests. Milne
(2013) reports that over 500 ‘outsiders’, ranging from smallholder
farmers to inﬂuential politicians, claim land inside the provisional
community zone in O Rona. This is in addition to the families
that have moved into the village unopposed. As a direct result
of losing land to these outside interests, the boundaries of the O
Rona ICT have been substantially redrawn from those that were
included in the original ICT application. That application contained
plans for 1477 ha to be granted for communal agriculture and
residential use, while only 648 ha has been included within the
194 H. Travers et al. / Land Use Policy 43 (2015) 186–196
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edrawn boundaries. The remaining 829 ha has been lost to outside
nterests or non-IC households in the period between the original
pplication and receipt of ICT. Furthermore, the entire proposed
estern NTFP forest zone, which initially covered an area of 446 ha,
as either already been deforested or has been included as part of
he 648 ha designated for community agricultural use to compen-
ate for the losses in this zone.
It is debatable how much individual households have been
nvolved in the sale of community land to outsiders. Private access
o land designated for indigenous community title claims is often
chieved through the use of intimidation, misinformation and
tealth (Fox et al., 2008; Milne, 2013). Under the 2001 Land Law,
ommunities are not granted disposal rights, which makes it illegal
o sell land within ICTs, but this has not stopped sales. Although we
ound little evidence of direct sales of land parcels, a recent study
f tenure policy changes introduced to O Rona after the study was
ompleted reports frequent selling of plots by Bunong to migrant
hmer families or outside land speculators (Milne, 2013). Such
ales are considered shameful and, hence, frequently carried out
n private (Fox et al., 2008). As such, reported compliance with the
an on buying and selling land in O Rona may  under-estimate actual
ales. However, a comparison of land mapped for IC households
atched between the two  time periods (and for whom the head
f the household has remained the same) shows that 74% of the
and mapped in 2006 has been retained. Given that households are
xpected to have given some of this land as wedding gifts when
heir children married, it is possible that the selling of land that is
n use by IC households has been overstated (although this does not
reclude the selling of previously unclaimed community land).
Whilst the extent to which IC households have been involved
n the sale of land to outside interests is unclear, it is evident that
he inﬂux of external claims on community land has had a nega-
ive impact on IC households. In interviews, IC members frequently
xpressed frustration at their inability to exclude outsiders and
he loss of community land. For example, one woman told us that
before people used to try to stop the immigrants, but now we fear
utsiders because they are rich and powerful.” It is clear to them
hat their claim on the land, although recognised under law, is inse-
ure, thereby eroding one of the main beneﬁts of the provision of
enure. This in turn was used as a justiﬁcation for clearing outside
f designated community zones. As one man  put it, “we have to
lear outside the community boundaries because there is no more
and available”. Despite these pressures, however, the ICT process
ppears to have been partially successful in conservation terms, ased line shows the average area claimed per household for the whole sample.
IC members were less likely to claim illegal land and when they did
claim illegal land, they claimed 50% less land than non-IC members.
In Andong Kraloeng, the IC has made a concerted effort to
prevent large scale migration into the village, making access to
land for outside interests signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult (albeit the
village is under less pressure than O Rona). In part, this can be
attributed to the village situation at the time land use planning
was initiated. Unlike in O Rona, where the two-tier system was
necessitated in response to already high levels of in-migration
from non-indigenous households, Andong Kraloeng had very few
migrant households settle in the village prior to ICT. Of the 44
households sampled in this study, only ﬁve were non-IC house-
holds. This has contributed to a stronger sense of community
identity and ownership of customary lands, as well as greater belief
in their right to exclude outside interests from their land. Conse-
quently, villagers report having turned away numerous migrant
households since receiving ICT. As such, those conditions most
commonly associated with positive outcomes for tenure reform
have been achieved and compliance (particularly in regard to IC
rules) has beneﬁted (Ostrom, 1990).
Despite the generally positive situation for Andong Kraloeng,
there appears to have been a breakdown of the traditional rota-
tional cultivation system in response to the emergence of cash
crops over the past decade. This does not necessarily represent a
failing of the ICT process as no system can be expected to remain
static over time, particularly in the face of rapidly changing socio-
economic conditions. It does, however, underscore the importance
of allowing for possible changes as part of the planning process and
of ensuring that the institutions that are created to manage commu-
nity zones have the capacity to be able to respond to those changes.
As agriculture becomes more commercialised in Andong Kraloeng,
it remains to be seen whether social institutions within the vil-
lage can adapt, particularly if it brings inﬂuential households into
conﬂict with IC regulations. The results of the household analyses
support this, with those households with greater land holdings (i.e.
older, more afﬂuent and more established households) more likely
to be non-compliant with community boundaries and regulations
and also found to hold more illegal land if non-compliant.
The results regarding the perceptions of IC members of the IC
committees in each village suggest that the social processes and
institutions that support the management of community land may
play an important role in maintaining compliance with the deﬁned
community boundaries and regulations. In Andong Kraloeng,
committee leadership is strong, with committee members seen to
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e compliant with community regulations and legal boundaries,
nd ordinary community members display a greater awareness
f the committee’s role in managing community land. In O Rona,
here the overall perception the IC committee is poor, the ICT pro-
ess is largely considered to be an externally imposed intervention,
nd not supported.
This has important implications for how ICT and participatory
and use planning approaches are implemented elsewhere. In other
illages in SPF, for example, improved road access to more remote
illages, and the increasing threat of land alienation caused by
conomic land concessions, has led to the acceleration of the ICT
rocess. Whilst this has been forced by the changing conditions to
hich these villages are exposed, the FA and WCS  must be careful
o ensure that the necessary support is given to local social insti-
utions, which are critical to the successful implementation and
ustainability of IC managed lands. With its origins in the recog-
ised need to support and empower local voices, this lesson is also
articularly relevant to the implementation of participatory land
se planning approaches more broadly.
Similarly important is the need to ensure on-going compliance
onitoring, both within the community zones and the protected
rea, and to provide external support for this where required. The
onsiderable loss of community lands in O Rona, and the perceived
nability of IC members to prevent it, demonstrates that simply sup-
orting a community through the legal processes required to apply
or tenure is not sufﬁcient. External political support may  be nec-
ssary to assist communities in excluding outside interests from
llegal land grabs. Without this, the security that the establishment
f tenure should introduce may  not materialise, leading to some of
he issues observed in O Rona.
It may  also be necessary to provide stronger enforcement of
ommunity boundaries. Unenforced boundaries will fail to induce
ufﬁcient incentive for local institutional development and effec-
ive management of community resources. In Andong Kraloeng,
here the threat of external land grabbing is low and available
and is far from scarce, 26% of land has still been cleared illegally.
hile it is possible that this is due to a lack of understanding of the
ules that govern land use or of where the boundaries of each zone
ie, it is more likely that these areas have been cleared despite an
nderstanding that to do so would be illegal. Effective policing of
uch infractions is likely to increase the incentive for committees
o manage land use within community zones more effectively. This
s supported by the result of the community regulation compliance
odel, which suggested that households may  offset their non-
ompliance with community rules (to which they may  feel more
ocial pressure to conform) through land use outside of commu-
ity boundaries. As such, protected area authorities should support
ommunity monitoring and exclusion of outside interests within
ommunity boundaries, whilst ensuring adequate enforcement of
ommunity expansion beyond those boundaries.
onclusion
Through this study, we have seen how two  contrasting vil-
ages have coped with implementing tenure reform. In one village,
he evidence presented provides support for the proposition that
enure reform in protected areas conducted with the participation
f minority indigenous communities can be consistent with posi-
ive outcomes for biodiversity conservation (in this case, retention
f protected forest cover), whilst providing communities with the
ights to customary lands. In the other village, these positive effects
ave been largely negated by severe disruption from outside inter-
sts, powerful market forces and a failure in leadership on the part
f those local institutions created to manage communal lands. In
uch cases, it is in the interests of both communities and those
eeking to further conservation for local people to be provided withicy 43 (2015) 186–196 195
the institutional support necessary to protect and manage their
resources effectively.
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